SMU Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law

Article 11

January 2005

Corporations
Glenn D. West
Sarah E. Stasny

Recommended Citation
Glenn D. West & Sarah E. Stasny, Corporations, 58 SMU L. REV. 719 (2005)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol58/iss3/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

CORPORATIONS
Glenn D. West*
Sarah E. Stasny**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................
II. DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS ............
A.

CONTRACTUALLY AVOIDING EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL

C LAIMS ...............................................
B.

719
720

721

CONTRACTUALLY EXONERATING CORPORATE
OFFICERS FROM PERSONAL EXPOSURE FOR TORT
LIABILITIES ARISING OUT OF CORPORATE

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

.........................

C. ENSURING THAT A LETTER OF INTENT REMAINS A
LETTER OF INTENT ...................................

III. SALE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE
ASSETS OF A COPRORATION .........................

726
727
731

I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this annual survey of Texas corporate law is to provide
Texas lawyers an analysis of the latest court decisions affecting corporate
practice.' In the last few years, we have focused our Texas Corporations
Surveys principally on (1) specific considerations of importance to attorneys drafting corporate agreements governed by Texas law; and (2) the
interplay between (a) the vulnerability of corporate officers under Texas
common law to personal tort liability arising from the negotiation and
execution of agreements entered into solely on behalf of their corporation, and (b) the Texas Legislature's seemingly firm commitment to exonerate corporate officers from any liabilities arising from a contractual
obligation created by a Texas corporation. 2 A number of Texas cases de* Glenn D. West is a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
** Sarah E. Stasny is an associate in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas. Mr. West and Ms. Stasny express special thanks to R. Jay
Tabor, a partner in the Corporate Department of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas,
Texas, for his helpful comments and assistance with our discussion of avoidance of extracontractual waivers of express contractual representations based on a buyer's pre-closing
knowledge of a breach of such representations.
1. As noted in prior Texas Corporations Surveys, the scope of this Survey specifically
excludes securities laws, as another Survey article addresses those issues.
2. See Glenn D. West & Adam D. Nelson, Corporations,57 SMU L. REV. 799 (2004);
Glenn D. West & Susan Y. Chao, Corporations,56 SMU L. REV. 1395 (2003); Glenn D.
West & Brandy L. Treadway, Corporations,55 SMU L. REV. 803 (2002); Glenn D. West,
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cided during 2004 continue to underscore these issues of Texas law and
the need for specific drafting to avoid unintended consequences in corporate acquisition or other agreements. This year we provide specific suggested contractual provisions to address these issues in our discussion of
drafting corporate agreements in Part II of this Survey.
Last year's discussion of Benchmark Electronics, Inc. v. J.M. Huber
Corp.3 provided an opportunity to explore specific differences between
New York and Texas law on the availability of extra-contractual tort
claims based upon contractual representations in a stock purchase agree-4
ment. In Part III of this Survey, Rudisill v. Arnold White & Durkee, P.C.
provides us an opportunity to discuss specific differences between Delaware and Texas corporate law in connection with the question of when
stockholders' approval is required to sell "all or substantially all" of the
assets of a corporation. Despite the fact that many corporate lawyers in
Texas find that they are more familiar with Delaware corporate law than
Texas (given the dominance of Delaware as the state of incorporation for
many of the corporations based in Texas), and despite the fact that both
the Delaware and Texas corporate statutes were originally based on the
same Model Business Corporation Act, it is a mistake to assume that the
statutory frameworks are the same.
II.

DRAFTING CORPORATE AGREEMENTS

As noted in last year's Texas Corporations Survey, the Texas courts
continue to demonstrate "a refreshingly clear commitment to the sanctity
of the written agreement."'5 That commitment was reinforced during this
Survey period by a pair of decisions by the Texas Supreme Court specifically upholding a forum selection clause in an insurance policy 6 and a
contractual jury waiver clause in a commercial lease. 7 The Texas courts'
commitment to the sanctity of contract means that Texas courts will enforce an unambiguous agreement as written because the parties "are entitled to select what terms and provisions to include in a contract before
executing it ...

[and] each is entitled to rely upon the words selected to

demarcate their respective obligations and rights." 8

Corporations,54 SMU L. REV. 1221 (2001); Glenn D. West & Christopher M. Fairman,
Corporations,53 SMU L. REV. 773 (2000).

3. 343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2003). See also West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 816-17.
4. 148 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).

5. West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 820.
6. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004); see also Levy v. City of Rio
Grande, No. 3-04-CV-0381-B, 2004 WL 2847273 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2004).
7. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004).
8. ASI Techs., Inc. v. Johnson Equip. Co., 75 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.-San

Antonio 2002, pet. denied). See West & Chao, supra note 2, at 1416 n.161; see also Burke
v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 138 S.W.3d 46, 62 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. filed) ("The
agreement will be enforced as created regardless of whether the parties contracted
wisely."); Breitenfeld v. SAS Inst., Inc., 147 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no

pet. h.) ("In an unambiguous contract, we will not imply language, add to language, or
interpret it other than pursuant to its plain meaning."); The Frost Nat'l Bank v. L&F Distribs., Ltd., 122 S.W.3d 922, 932 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. filed) ("[I]t is not
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Despite the Texas courts' strong commitment to holding contracting
parties to their written, signed agreements, 9 we have identified in past
Texas Corporations Surveys at least three areas of extra-contractual exposure arising from the negotiation and execution of those contractual
agreements by the contracting corporate parties and their officers. Those
three areas of extra-contractual exposure are (1) the vulnerability of contracting parties to tort claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation
arising from extra-contractual representations, as well as from the representations expressly set forth in the contract; 10 (2) the vulnerability of
corporate officers, as agents of their corporate principals, to tort liability
arising from the negotiation and execution of corporate contractual
agreements; 1 and (3) the vulnerability of contracting parties to being
bound by preliminary corporate agreements intended as mere letters of
intent. 12 Last year we suggested that each of these areas of potential extra-contractual exposure could paradoxically be mitigated by precise
drafting in the very corporate agreements from which these extra-contractual exposures arise. 13 This year we take each of those extra-contractual exposures in turn and provide suggested contractual provisions to
address that exposure.
A.

CONTRACTUALLY AVOIDING EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS

Last year we identified a peculiarity of Texas law that permits a party

14
to a contract to disclaim reliance on extra-contractual representations
but to nonetheless pursue tort claims outside of the contract for fraud or
negligent misrepresentation based upon the specific representations set

within the province of the court to vary contractual terms in order to protect parties from
the consequences of their own oversights and failures in nonobservance of obligations assumed."). As noted in last year's Texas Corporations Survey, however, there is a requirement that the agreement must have been "freely bargained," and mutual mistake, duress,
unconscionability or the breach of fiduciary duty will eviscerate that free bargain. See West
& Nelson, supra note 2, at 813, 820 n.81. During this Survey period, the effect of making a
heavily one-sided agreement with a person of limited bargaining power and thereby rendering it "substantively unconscionable" was addressed at length in In re Luna, No. 01-0301055-CV, 2004 WL 2005935, at *2-5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 9, 2004, orig.
proceeding [mand. pending]). On the other hand, as noted by one Texas court during this
Survey period, "illiteracy" alone is not a basis for avoiding enforcement of a contract as
written. In re Ledet, No. 04-04-00411-CV, 2004 WL 2945699, at *5 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Dec. 22, 2004, no pet. h.).
9. See West & Chao, supra note 2, at 1416, 1429 n.161.
10. West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 814-17; see also Gore v. Scotland Golf, Inc., 136
S.W.3d 26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied).
11. West, supra note 2, at 1226-30; West & Treadway, supra note 2, at 811-16; West &
Chao, supra note 2 at 1403-08; West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 804-09.
12. West, supra note 2 at 1233-38; West & Treadway, supra note 2, at 818-23; West &
Chao, supra note 2 at 1411-15; West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 818-19.
13. West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 817, 820 n.106.
14. Id. at 814 n.85; see also IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Eifert, 125 S.W.3d 113, 12528 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); Coasta Bank SSB v. Chase Bank
of Tex., N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.); Cherry v.
McCall, 138 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
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forth in that contract. 15 Most contractual disclaimer clauses involve the
buyer disclaiming reliance on any representations not expressly set forth
in the contract. As to those representations that are expressly set forth in
the contract, the parties obviously intend that the buyer be able to rely
upon them and seek contractual remedies against the seller for their
breach. The possibility that the buyer could bring claims for contractual
breach, as well as extra-contractual tort claims against the seller based on
the agreed contractual representations set forth in the contract that disclaimed reliance on extra-contractual representations is, we suspect, not
fully appreciated and seldom addressed.
Our discussion of Benchmark Electronics in last year's Texas Corporations Survey revealed that New York law is significantly different from
Texas law in this respect.1 6 New York law apparently does not permit
tort claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation based solely upon
representations set forth in a contract. Rather, a buyer's claims, to the
extent they relate to contractual representations, are limited to breach of
contract.1 7 Texas, on the other hand, does allow such tort claims on the
theory that there is a duty, independent of the contract, not to fraudulently or negligently make misrepresentations. The fact that the misrepresentations are limited to those specifically set forth in a contract (by
virtue of the disclaimer clause respecting representations not set forth in
the contract) does not change or eliminate that separate, independent
duty or the remedy in tort for its breach.1 8 Accordingly, under Texas law,
the standard disclaimer of reliance on extra-contractual representations
will foreclose both contract and tort liability for claims based on any representation not expressly set forth in the contract, 19 it but will leave the
15. West & Nelson supra note 2, at 817, 820 n.106; see also F.S. New Prods., Inc. v.
Strong Indus., 129 S.W.3d 606, 619-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. granted).
16. West & Nelson supra note 2, at 817, 820 n.105.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 814-816; see also Dallas Fire Ins. Co. v. Tex. Contractors Sur. & Cas. Agency,
128 S.W.3d 279, 294 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004), rev'd on other grounds, No. 04-0215,
2004 WL 2913657 (Tex. 2004) ("[A]n independent duty is imposed on the general public to
abstain from inducing others to enter into contracts by the use of fraudulent misrepresentations, irrespective of whether the misrepresentations are later subsumed into the contract
or whether the damages suffered are only the economic loss related to the subject matter
of the contract."); Conquest Drilling Fluids v. Tri-Flo Int'l, 137 S.W.3d 299, 309-10 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 2004) ("A duty to not act illegally to procure a contract is separate and
independent from the duties established by the contract itself."). But see Castle Pro. Ltd.
P'ship v. The Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, pet. denied) (Except with respect to contracts "creating fiduciary relationships ... and in the absence of
independent injury, if a contract spells out the parties' respective rights regarding a particular matter, the contract, not common law tort principles, governs any dispute about that
matter.").
19. West & Nelson supra note 2, at 817, 820 n.105; see also Cherry v. McCall, 138
S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004); Cronus Offshore, Inc. v. Kerr McGee Oil &
Gas Corp., 2004 WL 3330786 (E.D. Tex. 2004). As noted last year, however, standard
disclaimer of reliance on extra-contractual representation clauses will not be effective
against an "unsophisticated party." See id. at 814, 820 n.85; see also Carousel's Creamery,
L.L.C. v. Marble Slab Creamery, Inc., 134 S.W.3d 385,394 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2004, pet. granted). Disclaimer clauses procured by fraud are likewise not enforceable.
Nelson v. Najm, 127 S.W.3d 170, 175-76 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. de-
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tort liability based on representations
door open for both contract and 20
contract.
the
in
contained
are
that
To address this issue, we suggest that corporate sellers consider adding
the following provision (in addition to the typical provision whereby the
buyer disclaims reliance upon any representations not expressly set forth
in the contract) to their purchase and sale agreements:
Exclusivity of Agreement. The parties hereto have voluntarily
agreed to define their rights, liabilities and obligations respecting the
subject matter of this Agreement exclusively in contract pursuant to
the express terms and provisions of this Agreement; and the parties
hereto expressly disclaim that they are owed any duties not expressly
set forth in this Agreement. The sole and exclusive remedies for any
breach of the terms and provisions of this Agreement (including any
representations and warranties set forth herein) shall be those remedies available at law or in equity for breach of contract only (as such
contract remedies may be further limited or excluded pursuant to the
express terms of this Agreement); and the parties hereto hereby
waive and release any and all tort claims and causes of action that
may be based upon, arise out of or relate to this Agreement, or the
negotiation, execution or performance of this Agreement (including
any tort claim or cause of action based upon, arising out of or related
to any representation or warranty made in or in connection with 2this
1
Agreement or as an inducement to enter into this Agreement).
Given the fact that the ability of buyers to bring extra-contractual tort
claims for breaches of contractual representations does not exist in some
other states, such as New York, we also suggest that special attention be
22
paid to the choice of law clause in purchase and sale agreements. The
typical choice of law clause in a purchase and sale agreement is very similar to the clause in the stock purchase agreement reviewed by the court in
Benchmark Electronics, which reads, "This Agreement shall be governed
by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of New
nied); Savage v. Doyle, 153 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.). Similarly,
disclaimer clauses that deal only with the condition of the property being sold will not
protect the seller from negligent misrepresentation claims relating to other matters. See
Oat Note, Inc. v. Ampro Equities, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.
h.).
20. West & Nelson supra note 2, at 817, 820 n.104. Of course this raises the specter of
exemplary damages which are not supposed to be available for breach of contract. See
Lisanti v. Dixon, 147 S.W.3d 638, 645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.) ("Even if the
breach [of contract] is malicious, intentional, or capricious, exemplary damages may not be
awarded unless the plaintiff proves a distinct tort.").
21. This clause is not a substitute for, but is an addition to, the negotiations that should
occur with respect to limitations on consequential damages or lost profits, as well as the
exclusivity of contractual indemnification claims as the sole contractual remedy under the
contract. See SAVA Gumarska in Kemijska Industra D.D. v. Advanced Polymer Scis., Inc.,
128 S.W.3d 304, 317 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.) ("[P]arties to a contract are free
to limit or modify the remedies available for breach of their agreement.").
22. Issues related to the requirements for properly selecting another state's law to apply to a contract are beyond the scope of this Survey; another Survey article addresses
choice of law issues.
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York."'23 Unfortunately, as noted by the Fifth Circuit in Benchmark Electronics, this formulation of a choice of law clause "is narrow because it
deals only with the construction and interpretation of the contract. '24 It
does not address the law that will be applicable to extra-contractual tort
claims arising out of or related to the contract. Accordingly, even where
parties agree that the contract will be governed by the laws of a particular
state (such as New York) that does not permit tort claims based on
breach of contractual representations, the choice of law clause must be
carefully drafted to avoid application of Texas law to tort claims arising
25

out of the contract.
During this Survey period, a Texas court specifically upheld the applicability of another jurisdiction's law to tort claims arising from a contractual relationship because of the expansive language used in the choice of
law clause selecting that jurisdiction. 26 We suggest using a similar formulation for choice of law provisions in purchase and sale agreements:

Governing Law. This Agreement, and all claims or causes of action
(whether in contract or tort) that may be based upon, arise out of or
relate to this Agreement or the negotiation, execution or performance of this Agreement (including any claim or cause of action based
upon, arising out of or related to any representation or warranty
made in or in connection with this Agreement or as an inducement
to enter into this Agreement), shall be governed by the internal laws
of the State of

_

27

Finally, in fairness to buyers who have agreed to have their rights determined and limited by the terms of the contract, some consideration
should be given to assuring the buyer that the contractual representations
for which the buyer bargained are not forfeited by the seller's subsequent
claim of extra-contractual waiver based on the buyer's own investigation
or knowledge. A few courts have held that, in the absence of an express
reservation of rights, a buyer waives its right to enforce a contractual representation that the buyer knows was untrue when made or that the
23. Benchmark Elecs., Inc v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2003).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 727.
26. El Pollo Loco, S.A. de C.V. v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 986 (S.D. Tex.
2004). The choice of law clause required the application of the laws of Mexico to "[ajll
disputes which may arise in connection with the performance of this Agreement." Id. at
988. According to the court, all of the plaintiff's tort claims were disputes that were connected with the performance of the Agreement. Id. at 989. But see Loy v. Harter, 128
S.W.3d 397, 403-05 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (holding that an arbitration
clause covering all claims "arising under or in connection with" an employment agreement
did not cover tort claims arising from alleged breach of fiduciary duty of employee when
he was acting in his capacity as director of the corporate employer); In re All Trac Transp.,
Inc., 306 B.R. 859, 910 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (tortious interference with contract claim
governed by Texas law, not Utah law, despite a clause in the contract that stated "This
Agreement and all transactions contemplated hereunder and/or evidenced hereby shall be
governed by, construed under and enforced in accordance with the internal laws of the
State of Utah.").
27. For additional suggestions for drafting an effective choice of law clause, see Tina L.
Stark, Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate § 6.02 (2003).
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28
buyer learns was untrue after signing the contract but before closing.
These cases seem to be based upon the notion that "reliance" is a necessary element of a breach of contract claim based upon an express warranty in the same way "reliance" is a necessary element of a tort action
2 9 While some of these cases apfor fraud or negligent misrepresentation.
pear to be based entirely upon an analysis of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the requirement of proof of reliance to recover under an express
contractual warranty appears to be a common law concept and, therefore,
is potentially applicable whether or not the transaction involves a sale of
goods.30 To address this issue, we suggest that corporate buyers consider
adding the following provision to their acquisition agreements:
No Waiver of Representations and Warranties. Because Buyer has
agreed to limit its rights to those specifically set forth in this Agreement, and to disclaim any extra-contractual representations and warranties or claims, Seller has agreed that Buyer's rights to
indemnification for the express representations and warranties set
forth herein are part of the basis of the bargain contemplated by this
Agreement; and, except to the extent specifically set forth in the
Schedules to this Agreement, Buyer's rights to indemnification (as
shall not be
specifically set forth in and limited by Paragraph -)
to have
deemed
be
shall
Buyer
(and
of
virtue
by
waived
affected or
relied upon the express representations and warranties set forth
herein notwithstanding) any knowledge on the part of Buyer of any
untruth of any such representation or warranty of Seller expressly set
forth in this Agreement, regardless of whether such knowledge was
obtained through Buyer's own investigation or through disclosure by
Seller or another person, and regardless of whether such knowledge
was obtained before or after the execution and delivery of this
Agreement.

28. See Coastal Power Int'l, Ltd. v. Transcon. Capital Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 345
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997); Galli v. Mertz, 973
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1992). These cases are cited and discussed in Robert F. Quaintaince, Can
You Sandbag? When a Buyer Knows Seller's Reps and Warrantiesare Untrue, 5 THE M&A
LAWYER 8 (2002). Of course, sometimes it is the parties' express intention that the buyer
will be deemed to have waived its indemnification right for a particular breach if it closes
while having knowledge of that breach. In such cases, the parties include a so-called "antisandbagging" clause in the acquisition agreement to make this intention clear. A buyer
should carefully consider the implications of agreeing to such a provision, however, because the seller may create an issue of fact in response to any buyer indemnification claim
simply by claiming that the buyer must have known about the breach. In any event, a
buyer should be aware, as described above, that the buyer might be deemed to have
waived its rights even if no "anti-sandbagging" provision is included. See Quaintaince,
supra.
29. See CBS, Inc. v. Ziff Davis Publ'g Co., 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. 1990); Frank J.
Woziniak, Annotation, Purchaser's Disbelief, or Nonreliance Upon, Express Warranties
Made by Seller in Contractfor the Sale of Business as Precluding Action for Breach of
Express Warranties, 7 A.L.R. 5TH 841 (1992).
30. See Ziff Davis Publ'g, 553 N.E.2d at 1002 n.2; Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951
S.W.2d 420, 436 (Tex. 1997) ("Though not a fraud-based claim, an express warranty claim
also requires a form of reliance... [and the Uniform Commercial Code's requirement that
express warranties be] part of the 'basis of the bargain' loosely reflects the common-law
express warranty requirement of reliance.").
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CONTRACTUALLY EXONERATING CORPORATE OFFICERS FROM
PERSONAL EXPOSURE FOR TORT LIABILITIES ARISING OUT
OF CORPORATE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

We were reminded during this Survey period that "a corporate agent
can be held individually liable for fraudulent statements or knowing misrepresentations even when they are made in the capacity of a corporate
representative. ' 31 Our repeated calls for the Texas courts to properly apply Article 2.21 of the Texas Business Corporation Act 32 and to preempt
the application of this common-law agency principal in the context of corporate officers negotiating and executing corporate contractual obligations were unheeded in the past and were unheeded during this Survey
period. 33 The possibility that corporate officers could be held personally
liable for torts arising from the negotiation and execution of corporate
31. A.C.S. Wright v. Sage Eng'g, Inc., 137 S.W.3d 238, 250 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); see also Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. v. Carpenter, 143 S.W.3d
560, 564 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed) ("[A] corporate agent is personally liable for
his own fraudulent or tortious acts, even when acting within the course and scope of his
employment."); Morris v. Powell, 150 S.W.3d 212, 220-21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004,
no pet. h.) ("Corporate agents are individually liable for fraudulent or tortious acts committed while in the service of their corporation."). This result applies to the corporate
officer even though he is acting solely on behalf of his corporate principal and "regardless
of whether he receives any personal benefit from the tortious act." See Cass v. Stephens,
156 S.W.3d 38 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2004, orig. proceeding [mand. pending]); see also West
& Treadway, supra note 2, at 812, 820 n.65.
32. Article 2.21 provides in pertinent part that
A holder of shares.... or any affiliate thereof or of the corporation,shall be
under no obligation to the corporation or to its obliges with respect to...
any contractual obligation of the corporation or any matter relatingto or arising from the obligation on the basis that the holder ... or affiliate is or was
the alter ego of the corporation, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, unless the
obligee demonstrates that the holder . . . or affiliate caused the corporation
to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did not perpetrate an actual
fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the holder,
... or affiliate; ... (emphasis supplied).
33. See West, supra note 2, at 1226-31; West & Treadway, supra note 2, at 814-16; West
& Chao, supra note 2, at 1403-08; West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 804-09. As noted in past
Texas Corporations Surveys, and reaffirmed during this Survey period, the Texas courts
appear prepared to accept the applicability of Article 2.21 in veil piercing cases directed at
corporate shareholders. See West & Chao, supra note 2, at 1403-08; West & Nelson, supra
note 2, at 804-09; Rimade Ltd. v. Hubbard Enters., Inc., 388 F.3d 138 (5th Cir. 2004); Signal
Peak Enters. of Tex., Inc. v. Bettina Inv., Inc., 138 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004,
pet. struck). The Texas courts do not, however, appear prepared to accept the idea that a
corporate officer, acting as an agent and fiduciary at the direction and under the authority
and control of her corporation, is an affiliate of the corporation for the purpose of Article
2.21 and therefore entitled to its protections. See West & Chao, supra note 2, at 1403-08;
West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 804-09. For further support for the idea that a corporate
officer is an affiliate of her corporation because, as an agent and fiduciary, she is under the
control of her corporate principal see Nat'l Plan Adm'rs, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Ins. Co., 150
S.W.3d 718, 730 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed) ("A true fiduciary is bound to serve
the primary interests of the principal and to subvert his own self-interests when they are in
conflict."); Loy v. Harter, 128 S.W.3d 397, 407 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied)
("[O]bedience" is one of the "broad duties [that] stem from the fiduciary status of corporate officers...."); Crooks v. Moses, 138 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.
h.) ("Agency is the consensual relationship between two parties when one, the agent, acts
on behalf of the other, the principal, and is subject to the principal's control.").
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contracts is particularly troublesome given our discussion in Section II,
Part A. In an effort to contractually exonerate corporate officers from
liability for fraud or negligent misrepresentation arising from statements
made on behalf of their corporate principal in connection with the negotiation and execution of a corporate contractual obligation (whether such
statements are made outside or inside the four corners of the contract),
provision in purchase and sale
we suggest the inclusion of the following
34
agreements between corporate parties:
No Third Party Liability. This Agreement may only be enforced
against the named parties hereto. All claims or causes of action
(whether in contract or tort) that may be based upon, arise out of or
relate to this Agreement, or the negotiation, execution or performance of this Agreement (including any representation or warranty
made in or in connection with this Agreement or as an inducement
to enter into this Agreement), may be made only against the entities
that are expressly identified as parties hereto; and no officer, director, shareholder, employee or affiliate of any party hereto (including
any person negotiating or executing this Agreement on behalf of a
party hereto) shall have any liability or obligation with respect to this
Agreement or with respect to any claim or cause of action (whether
in contract or tort) that may arise out of or relate to this Agreement,
or the negotiation, execution or performance of this Agreement (including a representation or warranty made in or in connection with
35
this Agreement or as an inducement to enter into this Agreement).
C.

ENSURING THAT A LETTER OF INTENT REMAINS A LETTER

OF INTENT

Whether a particular memorandum, letter, or other document constitutes an enforceable obligation or a mere expression of intent continues
to be the focus of a number of decisions by the Texas courts. The absolute necessity of clearly stating that a letter of intent is not intended to be
enforceable has been emphasized repeatedly during each of the last four
Survey periods. 36 In the absence of an express intent to be nonbinding,
Texas courts repeatedly hold "that 'a binding contract may be formed if
the parties agree on the material terms, even though they leave open
other provisions for later negotiation,' and that 'a letter of intent may be
binding even though it refers to the drafting of a future, more formal,
34. One could also consider adding this provision as an additional sentence to the "No
Third Party Beneficiary" clause and simply change the caption to "No Third Party Beneficiary or Liability." One should make clear in the "no third party beneficiary" language,
however, that this provision is in fact intended to benefit third parties (i.e., the officers,
directors, shareholders, employees and affiliates of the corporate parties) in the same manner as exceptions are customarily made for indemnification provisions that benefit officers,
directors or employees.
35. We believe this clause will also help defeat "alter ego," "single business enterprise" and similar "piercing the corporate veil" claims.
36. See generally West, supra note 2, at 1233-38; West & Treadway, supra note 2, at
818-23; West & Chao, supra note 2, at 1411-15; West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 818-19.
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agreement." 37 Last year, however, we highlighted a case which declared,
"when subsequent actions by the parties suggest that they did intend to
be bound by an agreement that was expressly nonbinding, Texas courts
have held that the intent of the parties to be bound becomes a question of
fact."'38 We suggested, therefore, that in addition to a provision clearly
stating that the letter of intent was intended to be nonbinding, "consideration may also be given to including in a letter of intent a provision disclaiming any intention to be subsequently bound by a nonbinding letter
of intent as a result of actions taken in furtherance thereof. ' 39 During
this Survey period, COC Services, Ltd. v. CompUSA, Inc. 40 provided an

opportunity for a more thorough discussion of this purported "partial
performance" exception to the nonbinding nature of letters of intent that
clearly state they are nonbinding.
COC Services involved a proposed master franchise agreement involv-

ing CompUSA stores in Mexico. 41 The parties entered into a letter of

intent that granted "COC the exclusive right to negotiate to establish
stores in Mexico, subject to expiration on a set date."'42 The specified
expiration date was ultimately extended until December 31, 1999. Attached to the letter of intent were detailed forms of each of the proposed
master franchise agreements ("MA") and the proposed license agreement for the initial licensee operating under that MFA. The letter of intent further specified that "if both the MFA and a license agreement were
not timely executed, COC's exclusive negotiation rights expired with no
further obligations between the parties."'43 In other words, the letter of
intent contemplated only an exclusive right for COC to negotiate to in37. West & Chao, supra note 2, at 1411 (quoting John Wood Group USA, Inc. v. ICO,
Inc., 26 S.W.3d 12, 19-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), as reviewed in
West, supra note 2 at 1233-38). During this Survey period, in Kelly v. Rio Grande Computerland Group, 128 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.), the court found that
it was a fact question whether a letter of intent that was "explicitly made subject to 'approval of counsel for all parties and to the preparation and execution of a final binding
agreement prepared by counsel to all parties'" was an enforceable agreement even though
a subsequent purchase agreement that did not cover all of the terms of the letter of intent
was executed by the parties. Id. at 764. The court noted that the letter of intent did not
have a provision "clearly stating that the letter is nonbinding, as such negations of liability
have been held to be effective." Id. at 767. The court also held that it was a fact question
"whether the Purchase Agreement was only the first in a series of agreements to be executed by the parties as memorialized in the Letter of Intent." Id. at 769. Moreover, the
entire agreement clause in the purchase agreement was not considered to dispose of the
issue because it was, as many entire agreement clauses are, limited to "the subject matter
of this Agreement," which did not cover all the subjects covered by the letter of intent. Id.
at 768. The obvious fix here would have been specific mention of the letter of intent as
having been superseded by the purchase agreement if that was in fact the intent. See also
Castano v. San Felipe Agric., Mfg. & Irrigation Co., 147 S.W.3d 444, 449-51 (Tex. App.San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
38. Opus S. Corp. v. Limestone Constr., Inc., No. 03-CV-0711-G, 2003 WL 22329033,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2003); see also West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 818-19.
39. West & Nelson, supra note 2, at 820 n.122.
40. 150 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
41. Id. at 660.
42. Id. at 662.
43. Id. at 664.
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troduce a third party to CompUSA as the initial licensee for a specified
period, with the proviso that if the MFA and the initial license were not
executed before December 31, 1999, there would be no44further obligations of any kind under the letter of intent or the MFA.
The letter of intent was executed in January of 1999. In early September 1999, Grupo Carso, a Mexican company with a fifteen percent stake
in CompUSA, began discussions with COC about its franchising of CompUSA stores in Mexico. COC, Carso, and CompUSA met a few weeks
later concerning the proposed franchise arrangement whereby Carso
would presumably become the initial licensee. No further discussions
were held between COC and Carso; thereafter, CompUSA and Carso
periodically discussed Carso's interest in acquiring CompUSA in its entirety. After the September meetings between Carso, COC and CompUSA, COC had several conversations with the CEO of CompUSA
concerning the lack of responsiveness by Carso. About two weeks before
the letter of intent would expire, COC sent a proposal to CompUSA for a
new licensee candidate from Mexico. CompUSA responded that it had
insufficient information to evaluate the new candidate. In the first week
of January 2000, immediately following the expiration of the letter of intent, Carso and CompUSA again began negotiations regarding the acquisition of CompUSA by Carso. By the end of January 452000, those
negotiations led to the acquisition of CompUSA by Carso.
COC filed suit against CompUSA claiming that the unexecuted MFA
attached to the letter of intent was a binding, enforceable agreement that
CompUSA breached. COC also sued Carso for tortious interference
with the MFA. The jury found in favor of COC against both Carso and
and awarded substantial damages for lost profits and punitive
CompUSA
46
damages.
On appeal, the court focused on whether there was any issue of fact
that was properly submitted to the jury respecting the parties' intent to be
bound by the MFA. Among the issues considered by the court was
whether the parties' actions subsequent to the execution of the letter of
intent raised a fact issue of the parties' intent to be bound by the unexecuted MFA. 47 Among the evidence suggesting that CompUSA intended
to be bound by the MFA were statements made by the CompUSA CEO
44. Id.
45. Id. at 661.
46. Id. at 661-62.
47. The court also noted that the MFA, which despite its detail had left several terms
blank to be negotiated after the initial licensee was determined, lacked at least one essential term necessary to make it enforceable-the minimum revenue stream payable to CompUSA. Id. at 665. The court also suggested that Texas actually recognizes "a five-factor
test" for determining whether the binding nature of a letter of intent is a question of law
for the court or a question of fact for the jury. Those five factors, which derive from a
Second Circuit case applying New York law and which the John Wood court cited with
approval, are "(1) the language of the agreement, (2) the context of the negotiations, (3)
the existence of open terms, (4) partial performance, and (5) the necessity of putting the
agreement in final form, as indicated by the customary form of such transactions." Id. at
668 (citing Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989)). As
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and materials sent to prospective licensees approved by CompUSA suggesting that "COC currently owns a CompUSA Master Franchise. '48
COC also argued that it expended substantial "efforts to locate a suitable
licensee," which was one of the main obligations of COC under the
MFA. 49 According to the court, however, "COC's efforts to locate a licensee were consistent with performance of the [letter of intent] and not
unequivocally referable to COC's performing under the MFA" because
the letter of intent and COC's exclusive negotiation rights would terminate if both the MFA and an initial license agreement were not executed
prior to December 31, 1999. 50 Accordingly, the court refused to "consider conduct consistent with performance of the [letter of intent] as probative of performance under the MFA."' 51 Likewise, the court noted that
COC never performed any of the primary obligations specified in the
MFA, such as opening stores or paying the initial fee. More importantly,
the CEO's statements and his acquiescence in the preparation of materials for prospective licensees, and any of the other actions purported to be
in furtherance of the MFA, were insufficient to overcome the express language in the letter of intent. Therefore, there was no fact issue as to
whether the parties intended to be bound by the unexecuted MFA. 52
We suspect that, given the court's substantial deference to the language
of the letter of intent, the court's analysis would have been simplified if
the language of the letter of intent was clearer. We have set forth below
our suggested clause to clearly express that a letter of intent is not binding and that subsequent actions will not be deemed to alter that intent:
Non Binding Obligations. This letter is nonbinding and is intended
only to memorialize certain preliminary terms related to a proposed
transaction between the parties hereto; and the terms set forth
herein do not constitute all of the material terms upon which agreement must be reached. This letter is not intended to create and shall
not create any binding, enforceable obligations between the parties
hereto; and no prior or subsequent conduct or action by the parties
hereto, whether in furtherance of the proposed transaction or otherwise, shall abrogate the foregoing disclaimer of intent to be bound
hereby or create any binding obligations respecting the proposed
transaction. A binding obligation respecting the proposed transaction shall arise, if at all, only upon the execution of a subsequent
formal agreement by all the parties hereto, the terms of which shall
supersede this letter and all prior negotiations, discussions, representations, agreements and understandings, whether written or oral, re53
specting the proposed transaction.
noted by the COC Services court, however, "the first factor, the language of the agreement,
is the most important." Id.
48. Id. at 669.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 668-69.
52. Id. at 670.
53. Obviously a letter of intent may include certain binding provisions such as expense
reimbursement, exclusivity of negotiations and confidentiality. If there are binding provi-
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corporation (in this case, a law firm organized as a professional corporation) continued to engage in the legal services business, 67 the concurring
opinion emphasized that the legislative intent behind Article 5.09(B) was
to treat an asset sale as one in the usual and regular course of business if
if the
the corporation engaged in any business following the sale-"even
68
corporation did not engage in that business before the sale."
The relevant facts of the case are as follows. In 1999, two law firmsArnold White & Durkee, P.C. ("AWD") and Howrey & Simon
("H&S")-negotiated a Combination Agreement under which AWD
transferred all of its assets (other than a few that were specifically excluded) to H&S in exchange for becoming a "Level II Partner" in H&S.
H&S subsequently changed its name to Howrey Simon Arnold & White,
L.L.P. ("HSAW"). The assets specifically excluded were three vacation
69
condominiums, two insurance policies, and several automobile leases.
AWD, a Texas professional corporation, held a shareholders' meeting
to vote on the proposed combination with H&S, and the meeting notice
stated that a two-thirds majority of Class B and Class C shares would be
required for passage. At the meeting, the combination was approved by
a two-thirds vote. The three plaintiff-appellants in Rudisill were holders
of Class B or Class C shares. Each submitted a written objection to the
combination prior to the meeting and then voted against the combination
dissenting found in Article
at the meeting, pursuant to the procedures for
70
5.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.
AWD argued that, despite the fact that the transaction was submitted
for approval by a two-thirds majority shareholder vote, the sale was in the
usual and regular course of business pursuant to Article 5.09(B), and thus
dissenters' rights were not available. 71 The trial court agreed, and the
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that AWD continued to engage in business following the sale of nearly all of its assets to
a passive owner of a partnership
H&S, even though AWD was essentially
72
interest in the new firm, HSAW.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 561 n.7.
Id. at 566 (Frost, J., concurring).
Id. at 558.
Id.
The majority noted that AWD did in fact submit the transaction to a shareholder

vote and indicated in the meeting notice that a two-thirds majority vote was required for

approval. The majority found that this was irrelevant to its determination of whether dissenters' rights were available. See id. at 563. Pursuant to Article 5.11(A)(2), dissenters'

rights are available only in cases where a two-thirds majority shareholder vote is required,
which is not the case if Article 5.09(B) applies. See id.
72. Id. at 561. The majority added the following in a footnote, which puts an interesting gloss on the above discussion regarding whether, for purposes of Article 5.09(B), the
majority believed that a corporation must continue in the same business following the

transaction.
It is also important to note that, although the statute provides that a corpora-

tion can continue in business if it applies a portion of the consideration received from the transaction to the conduct of a business in which it engages

following the transaction, the parties have, for the most part, limited their
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The plaintiff shareholders cited the following facts in support of their
argument that AWD did not engage in any business following the transaction. AWD had no income other than what it received as a partner in
HSAW, had no clients separate from HSAW and did not market itself as a
separate firm. Indeed, as the plaintiffs noted, AWD transferred to H&S
all the assets it had previously used to operate a legal services business.
Moreover, following the combination, all of the shareholders of AWD
were eligible to become partners in HSAW; many shareholders began
holding themselves out as partners of HSAW. The number of shareholders and employees of AWD dwindled after the transaction, and as existing shareholders of AWD retired, withdrew or otherwise terminated
their relationship, AWD's partnership interest in HSAW was reduced by
the same percentage as the departing shareholder's equity interest in
AWD. 73 It is difficult to conceive of a practical difference between the
business combination crafted by AWD and H&S and one in which AWD
had been liquidated and its shareholders given direct partnership interests in HSAW.
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals disagreed with the plaintiffs,
however, holding that AWD did continue to engage in business following
its combination with H&S. In fact, the majority opinion concluded that
AWD continued to engage in the legal services business,74 a conclusion
75
that the concurring justice found unnecessary to reach.
The majority indicated that "[i]t is clear that AWD remained in the
legal services business, at least indirectly, in that (1) its shareholders and
employees continued to practice law under the auspices of HSAW, and
(2) it held an ownership interest in HSAW, which unquestionably continarguments to whether AWD continued in the legal services business after the
combination .... We shall therefore confine our discussion to that context.
Id. at 561 n.7. Arguably, this language suggests that the majority believed that the first part
of subsection (B) (requiring the corporation to "continue to engage in one or more businesses") actually requires the corporation to continue in one or more of the same businesses. However, it is not clear what the practical effect of such an interpretation would be
if a corporation can, pursuant to the second part of Article 5.09(B), "apply a portion of the
consideration received in connection with the transaction to the conduct of [any] business,"
regardless of whether it engaged in such business prior to the transaction. The above footnote in the majority opinion clearly contemplates that the second part of subsection (B)
contains no restriction on the type of business to which proceeds can be applied following
the transaction.
73. Id. at 558, 562 n.10, 573 n.7 (Frost, J., concurring).
74. Id. The majority cited several facts to support its holding that AWD continued as
"a viable corporation in the legal services business." Id. at 561. Among these facts were
that AWD continued to be a Texas corporation in good standing, with shareholders, employees, directors, officers and annual meetings. In addition, AWD maintained its own
financial and payroll records and continued to maintain a separate office in Chicago. As a
Level II Partner in HSAW, AWD had voting rights and received profits according to its
percentage of ownership in HSAW. And although AWD no longer owned the physical
assets it used to run its legal services business, the majority argued that "the only 'asset'
truly indispensable to continuing in the legal services business is the lawyer himself or
herself. Post-combination, AWD continued to retain attorneys as shareholders and employees and, as a HSAW partner, it indirectly retained the services of many more." Id. at
562 n.1l.
75. See id. at 574 (Frost, J., concurring).
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ues directly in the business."'76 The concurrence expressed some doubt
that AWD continued in the legal services business 77 but concluded, without any analysis, that AWD did continue to engage in some business following its combination with H&S, which was enough for7 8the concurrence
to hold that Article 5.09(B) applied to the transaction.
This outcome is surprising to corporate practitioners who are familiar
with traditional formulations of the "sale of all or substantially all assets"
provision. The concurrence highlighted the irregularity of Article 5.09(B)
among corporation laws:
Texas ...is unique in defining "usual and regular course of business"

in a way that includes the most unusual, irregular, and extraordinary
events in the life of a corporation. Texas' singular definition of this
well-worn term in [A]rticle 5.09(B) of the Texas Business Corporation Act effectively eliminates the necessity for shareholder approval
in many transactions that, even in the common parlance and undernever be considered in the "usual and regular course
standing, would
'79
of business."
Additionally, an official comment to the Model Business Corporation
Act (on which the Texas Business Corporation Act is based) provides
quite narrow circumstances in which it would be in the usual and regular
course of business for a corporation to sell all of its assets, including, for
example, the sale of a corporation's only business where the corporation
was formed to buy and sell businesses and the proceeds are to be reinvested in another business. 80 Article 5.09(B), however, was not drawn
from the Model Act, and the concurrence noted that a comparison of the
Texas provision to other similar statutes "suggests the Texas legislature
intended a major departure in the definition of 'usual and regular course
of business."81

What is unclear is whether the legislature intended this departure to
76. Id. at 563.
77. The concurrence pointed out that "[s]ince the effective date of the combination,
Arnold White & Durkee has been nothing more than a passive partner in Howrey Simon."
Id. at 573 n.7 (Frost, J., concurring). The concurrence further noted that:
[t]he majority finds that Arnold White & Durkee needs no more than lawyers themselves to engage in the legal-services business. The record shows
that when Arnold White & Durkee had clients, the firm used a great deal
more than lawyers to engage in the legal-services business, including leasehold interests, books, computers, furniture, equipment, and many other operating assets. Though it may be technically possible to engage in the legalservices business with no operating assets, as the majority suggests, Arnold
White & Durkee clearly did not do so before the asset transfer, when the
firm still had clients. With no "tools of the trade" it would seem that the
firm's few remaining lawyers and support staff would be ill-equipped to service clients even if there were some. Likewise, with no clients to consume
legal services, it is questionable whether Arnold White & Durkee could, directly or indirectly, continue in the legal-services business.
Id. at 573 n.8 (Frost, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 566, 573, 574 (Frost, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 566 (Frost, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 570 (Frost, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 57-71 (Frost, J., concurring).
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extend as far as the Rudisill decision. 82 In the Rudisill transaction, the
selling corporation retained no useful assets and continued only as the
owner of a partnership interest in the surviving entity. This raises the
question whether a selling corporation in Texas, in order to avoid the
shareholder approval and dissenters' rights provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act, need only structure a transaction such that a portion of its consideration is in the form of an ownership interest (e.g.,
preferred stock representing a right to payment of a certain amount if
certain financial targets are reached). The Rudisill concurrence indirectly
suggested that this would be the case.
Arguably, all the board of directors of a corporation would have to
do to avoid these statutory shareholder protections is to arrange for
the corporation to continue in some business-even though very different from the corporation's prior business-so that the corporation
can "engage in a business" after the sale of all or substantially all of
the corporation's assets. Given the relative ease of structuring a
transaction in this manner, a corporation in Arnold White &
Durkee's position could avoid triggering the statutory shareholder
protections, leaving minority shareholders vulnerable to fundamental corporate change without shareholder
approval or an appraisal
83
remedy for dissenting shareholders.
Thus, as the Rudisill decision makes clear, the Texas Legislature, in its
attempt to provide certainty to corporations engaging in significant asset
sales, has left the door wide open for Texas corporations to structure
transactions to avoid shareholder approval and dissenters' rights even in
the case of a transaction that is, in essence, a complete liquidation of the
corporation's assets.

82. One law professor, commenting on the Rudisill decision, disagreed with the court
that the Texas Legislature intended so broad an exception when it enacted Article 5.09(B).
See Jill Schachner Chanen, Dissenting PartnersLose Out in Merger Ruling: Texas Case Seen
as Boost to CorporationsOver Appraisal Rights, 41 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 1 (2004). Chanen
pointed out that the 1987 amendment to the Texas Business Corporation Act was made
after two notable Delaware cases indicated that "substantially all" might mean less than
fifty percent of a business's assets. Id. (citing Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1275 (Del. Ch.
1981) and Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974)). Indeed, both prior to
and after the 1987 enactment of Article 5.09(B), Delaware courts struggled to determine
whether a particular asset sale by a corporation was a sale of all or substantially all of the
corporation's assets. See supra note 59. It seems that the Texas Legislature, in enacting
Article 5.09(B), intended to avoid similar uncertainty in the case of a significant asset sale
by a Texas corporation.
83. Rudisill, 148 S.W.3d at 572 (Frost, J., concurring).
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